



# Information Technology Engineering

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Crypto, Secure Email, SSL, IPSec, Wireless Security, and Operational Security

# **NETWORK SECURITY**

Slides derived from those available on the Web site of the book  
“Computer Networking”, by Kurose and Ross, PEARSON

# Chapter 8 Outline

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8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography

8.3 Message integrity and End-Point Authentication

**8.4 Securing e-mail**

8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL


8.6 Network layer security: IPsec

8.7 Securing wireless LANs

8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

# Secure e-mail

- ❖ Alice wants to send confidential e-mail,  $m$ , to Bob.




## Alice:

- ❖ generates random *symmetric* private key,  $K_S$
- ❖ encrypts message with  $K_S$  (for efficiency)
- ❖ also encrypts  $K_S$  with Bob's public key
- ❖ sends both  $K_S(m)$  and  $K_B^+(K_S)$  to Bob

# Secure e-mail

- ❖ Alice wants to send confidential e-mail,  $m$ , to Bob.




**Bob:**

- ❖ uses his private key to decrypt and recover  $K_S$
- ❖ uses  $K_S$  to decrypt  $K_S(m)$  to recover  $m$

# Secure e-mail (continued)


- ❖ Alice wants to provide sender authentication message integrity



- ❖ Alice digitally signs message
- ❖ sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature

# Secure e-mail (continued)

- ❖ Alice wants to provide secrecy, sender authentication, message integrity.




*Alice uses three keys:* her private key, Bob's public key, newly created symmetric key

# Phil Zimmermann

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- Creator of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) in 1991, the most widely used email encryption software in the world
- PGP uses
  - MD5 or SHA for Hash function
  - CAST, triple-DES, or IDEA for symmetric key encryption
  - RSA for public key





# A PGP Signed Message

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hash: SHA1

Bob:

Can I see you tonight?

Passionately yours, Alice

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0

Charset: noconv

yhHJRHhGJGhgg/12EpJ+1o8gE4vB3mqJhFEvZP9t6n7G6m5Gw2

-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

# A Secret PGP Message

---

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0

u2R4d+/jKmn8Bc5+hgDsqAewsDfrGdszX68liKm5F6Gc4sDfcXyt  
RfdS10juHgbcfDssWe7/K=1KhnMikLo0+1/BvcX4t==Ujk9PbcD4  
Thdf2awQfgHbnmKlok8iy6gThlp

-----END PGP MESSAGE

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
# SSL: Secure Sockets Layer

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
- widely deployed security protocol
  - supported by almost all browsers, web servers
  - https
  - billions \$/year over SSL
- mechanisms: [Woo 1994], implementation: Netscape
- variation -TLS: transport layer security, RFC 2246
- provides
  - *confidentiality*
  - *integrity*
  - *authentication*
- original goals:
  - Web e-commerce transactions
  - encryption (especially credit-card numbers)
  - Web-server authentication
  - optional client authentication
  - minimum hassle in doing business with new merchant
- available to all TCP applications
  - secure socket interface

# SSL and TCP/IP

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
*normal application*



*application with SSL*

- ❖ SSL provides application programming interface (API) to applications
- ❖ C and Java SSL libraries/classes readily available

# Could do something like PGP:



- ❖ but want to send byte streams & interactive data
- ❖ want set of secret keys for entire connection
- ❖ want certificate exchange as part of protocol: handshake phase


# Toy SSL: a simple secure channel

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- *handshake*: Alice and Bob use their certificates, private keys to authenticate each other and exchange shared secret
- *key derivation*: Alice and Bob use shared secret to derive set of keys
- *data transfer*: data to be transferred is broken up into series of records
- *connection closure*: special messages to securely close connection

# Toy: a Simple Handshake

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**MS:** Master Secret

**EMS:** Encrypted Master Secret



# Toy: Key Derivation

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- Considered bad to use same key for more than one cryptographic operation
  - use different keys for message authentication code (MAC) and encryption
- four keys:
  - $K_c$  = encryption key for data sent from client to server
  - $M_c$  = MAC key for data sent from client to server
  - $K_s$  = encryption key for data sent from server to client
  - $M_s$  = MAC key for data sent from server to client
- keys derived from key derivation function (KDF)
  - takes master secret and (possibly) some additional random data and creates the keys

# Toy: Data Records

- Why not encrypt data in constant stream as we write it to TCP?
  - where would we put the MAC? If at end, no message integrity until all data processed.
  - e.g., with instant messaging, how can we do integrity check over all bytes sent before displaying?
- Instead, break stream in series of records
  - each record carries a MAC
  - receiver can act on each record as it arrives
- **Issue:** in record, receiver needs to distinguish MAC from data
  - want to use variable-length records



# Toy: Sequence Numbers

❖ *problem*: attacker can capture and replay record or re-order records

❖ *solution*: put sequence number into MAC:

- $MAC = MAC(M_x, \text{sequence}||\text{data})$
- note: no sequence number field

❖ *problem*: attacker could replay all records

❖ *solution*: use nonce

# Toy: Control Information

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- *problem*: truncation attack:
  - attacker forges TCP connection close segment
  - one or both sides thinks there is less data than there actually is.
- *solution*: record types, with one type for closure
  - type 0 for data; type 1 for closure
- $MAC = MAC(M_x, \text{sequence} || \text{type} || \text{data})$




# Toy SSL: summary



bob.com

*encrypted*



# Toy SSL isn't complete

- how long are fields?
- which encryption protocols?
- want negotiation?
  - allow client and server to support different encryption algorithms
  - allow client and server to choose together specific algorithm before data transfer

# SSL cipher suite

- Cipher suite
  - public-key algorithm
  - symmetric encryption algorithm
  - MAC algorithm
- SSL supports several cipher suites
- Negotiation: client, server agree on cipher suite
  - client offers choice
  - server picks one

## common SSL symmetric ciphers

- DES – Data Encryption  
Standard: block
- 3DES – Triple strength: block
- RC2 – Rivest Cipher 2: block
- RC4 – Rivest Cipher 4: stream

## SSL Public key encryption

- RSA

# Real SSL: handshake (I)

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## *Purpose*

1. server authentication
2. negotiation: agree on crypto algorithms
3. establish keys
4. client authentication (optional)



# Real SSL: handshake (2)

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1. client sends list of algorithms it supports, along with client nonce
2. server chooses algorithms from list; sends back: choice + certificate + server nonce
3. client verifies certificate, extracts server's public key, generates **pre\_master\_secret**, encrypts with server's public key, sends to server
4. client and server independently compute encryption and MAC keys **from pre\_master\_secret and nonces**
5. client sends a MAC of all the handshake messages
6. server sends a MAC of all the handshake messages

# Real SSL: handshaking (3)

last 2 steps protect handshake from tampering


- client typically offers range of algorithms, some strong, some weak
- man-in-the middle could delete stronger algorithms from list
- last 2 steps prevent this

# Real SSL: handshaking (4)

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- why two random nonces?
- suppose Trudy sniffs all messages between Alice & Bob
- next day, Trudy sets up TCP connection with Bob, sends exact same sequence of records
  - Bob (Amazon) thinks Alice made two separate orders for the same thing
  - solution: Bob sends different random nonce for each connection. This causes encryption keys to be different on the two days
  - Trudy's messages will fail Bob's integrity check


# SSL Record Protocol



*record header*: content type; version; length

*MAC*: includes sequence number, MAC key  $M_x$

# Real SSL connection



# Key derivation

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- Client nonce, server nonce, and pre-master secret input into pseudo random-number generator.
  - produces master secret
- Master secret and new nonces input into another random-number generator: “key block”
  - because of resumption
- Key block sliced and diced:
  - client MAC key
  - server MAC key
  - client encryption key
  - server encryption key
  - client initialization vector (IV)
  - server initialization vector (IV)